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Appellate Case No. 20090568 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Millard 
County, State of Utah. This court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Is the Board of Adjustment's finding that Appellant's carport is a 
"structure" under the definition of that term arbitrary, capricious or illegal? 
As the district court's review was limited to the record before the Board of Adjustment, 
this court should review the appeal "just as if the appeal had come directly from the agency." 
Wells v. Board of Adjustment 936 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). However, municipal 
land use decisions are generally entitled to "substantial deference." Patterson v. Utah County Bd. 
Of Adjustment 893 P.2d 602, 603-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Accordingly, the Board's 
decisions should be "given a strong presumption of validity." Id. 
2. Based upon evidence presented at the hearing before the Board of 
Adjustment, is Appellant entitled to a variance? 
As the district court's review was limited to the record before the Board of Adjustment, 
this court should review the appeal "just as if the appeal had come directly from the agency." 
Wells v. Board of Adjustment 936 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). However, municipal 
land use decisions are generally entitled to "substantial deference." Patterson v. Utah County Bd. 
Of Adjustment 893 P.2d 602, 603-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Accordingly, the Board's 
decisions should be "given a strong presumption of validity." Id 
3. Where Appellant was afforded the opportunity to present evidence and argument 
before the Board of Adjustment regarding his request for a variance, and where the district court 
was provided with a complete transcript of the Board's proceedings, was the district court's 
exclusion of additional evidence in support of a variance appropriate? 
This court should review the district court's decision to exclude additional evidence for 
correctness. See Davis County v. Clearfield City. 756 P.2d 704, 710 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
4. Was the district court's decision to limit review of Appellant's appeal to the 
record a denial of Appellant's due process? 
This court should review the district court's decision for correctness. See Davis County 
v. Clearfield City. 756 P.2d 704, 710 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are in Addendum 1 to 
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this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant constructed a carport with a metal roof on his property in violation of 
the Fillmore City Municipal Code in that it encroached on the lot setback requirement. After 
being served with notice of the violation, Appellant filed an appeal with the Fillmore City Board 
of Adjustment arguing that the carport was not in violation of the setback requirement as it was 
not a "structure" under the definition of that term in the Municipal Code and that, alternatively, 
he was entitled to a variance. Following a hearing, at which Appellant was provided an 
opportunity to present evidence and argument, the Board determined that the carport was a 
"structure" and, therefore, violated the setback requirement. The Board also voted to deny the 
Appellant's request for a variance. 
Appellant filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the Board's decision in the district court. 
At a hearing on Appellant's petition, the court instructed the parties to prepare memoranda on 
the issues before it. Appellant filed a memorandum of law and Appellee filed an opposing 
memorandum. Appellant subsequently filed a reply memorandum. The court found the Board's 
interpretation of the definition of a structure was reasonable, and therefore not arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal. The court also found that Appellant had not established that he was entitled 
to a variance. The court limited its review of the issues to the record provided to it and denied 
Appellant's request to present new evidence at a hearing on appeal. 
Appellant filed a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court, which was subsequently 
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transferred to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant constructed a carport with a metal roof on his property located in Fillmore 
City sometime prior to April, 2008 (R. 18: 25-28). Appellant installed the carport to protect his 
vehicle from the elements (R. 19: 79-82). On or about April 16, 2008, Appellant was served 
with a notice of violation of the Fillmore City zoning ordinance as the carport did not meet the 
lot setback requirements of Fillmore City Municipal Code ("Municipal Code") § 6-7-8.3 (R. 2). 
Appellant appealed the decision of the planning and zoning administrator and requested a 
hearing before the Fillmore City Board of Adjustment ("the Board"), which was held on or about 
July 31, 2008 (R. 18). At the hearing, Appellant argued that the carport is not a "structure" 
under the definition of that term in the Municipal Code and is, therefore, not in violation of the 
setback requirement (R. 18-19: 23-65). Appellant's argument centered around an assertion that 
because the carport was not "impervious" or completely enclosed, it does not fall under the 
definition of "structure" (R. 19: 44-65). The Board determined that the carport was a structure 
in that it was constructed of an impervious material, i.e. metal, and was, therefore, in violation of 
the setback requirement (R. 28-29: 482-490). 
Appellant next argued that he was entitled to a variance. Appellant addressed the 
requirements for a variance found in Utah Code Annotated § 10-9a-702 and argued that the 
carport satisfied the statute (R. 19-20: 67-110). The Board reviewed the requirements for a 
variance and applied them to the facts before it and voted to deny the variance (R. 23-24: 239-
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306; 26-28: 392-464). 
On or about August 27, 2008, Appellant filed a Petition for Judicial Review with the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, Millard County, State of Utah, alleging that the Board erred in its 
interpretation of the word "structure" and that he was entitled to a variance (R. 1-7.). 
On or about April 13, 2009, the district court held a hearing on the Appellant's Petition 
for Judicial Review (R. 36). At the hearing, the court instructed the parties to prepare 
memoranda on the matter, after which Appellant filed a memorandum, Appellee filed an 
response and Appellant filed a reply memorandum (R. 37, 46, 56). 
In his memorandum, Appellant alleged that the Board's interpretation of structure was 
arbitrary, capricious or illegal (R. 37). He also argued that he was not provided an opportunity to 
present evidence or argument regarding his request for a variance before the Board, or 
alternatively, the Board improperly excluded evidence, and therefore, he should be allowed to 
present new evidence on the issue of a variance before the district court. (Id.) 
On or about June 22, 2009, the district court entered a ruling affirming the Board's 
interpretation of structure as a reasonable interpretation, and therefore, not arbitrary, capricious 
or illegal (R. 66). The court also determined that Appellant was not entitled to a variance as he 
did not provide evidence that the carport satisfied the requirements set out in the statute (R. 66-
67). Additionally, the court found that Appellant was not entitled to present additional evidence 
on the issue of a variance as he was provided significant time and opportunity to present 
evidence and argument on the issue before the Board (R. 67-68). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant constructed a carport on his property in violation of the Fillmore City 
Municipal Code ("Municipal Code"). The carport violates the Code in that it does not meet the 
lot setback requirements of Code Section 6-7-8.3 as it is not set back 25 feet from the front 
property line. In his Brief of the Appellant ("Appellant's Brief), Appellant argues that the 
carport is not a "structure" under the definition of that term in the Municipal Code, and 
therefore, is not subject to the 25 foot setback requirement. However, substantial evidence 
presented at a hearing before the Fillmore City Board of Adjustment ("the Board"), supported a 
finding that because the carport is fixed to the ground, made of metal, which is an impervious 
material, and was built for the protection of Appellant's vehicle from the elements, it qualifies as 
a "structure" under the definition of that term. Because the Board's findings were not arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal, they should be upheld by this Court. 
Appellant argues that even if the carport satisfies the definition of "structure", and is 
therefore in violation of the Municipal Code, he is entitled to a variance. The requirements for a 
variance are clearly set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 10-9a-702 and are mirrored in 
Municipal Code Section 6-5-6. The appeal authority may grant a variance only if each of the 
requirements are satisfied. SeeU.C.A. § 10-9a-702(2)(a). At the hearing before the Board, 
Appellant requested a variance but failed to introduce evidence establishing that the carport 
satisfied any of the requirements provided under the statute. The Board considered each of the 
requirements and reasonably concluded that the evidence presented did not support a finding that 
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a variance should be granted. Accordingly, Appellant's argument that he is entitled to a variance 
fails. 
Finally, Appellant's argument that he was denied due process fails because he was 
afforded significant time and opportunity to present evidence and argument at the administrative 
level. Utah law provides property owners the opportunity to appeal a decision from a land use 
authority to an appeal authority. Upon timely request, property owners are afforded a hearing 
before the appeal authority at which time they are given the opportunity to present evidence in 
support of their position. Additionally, Section 10-9a-801of the Utah Code Annotated provides 
that district court review of the Board's decision is limited to the record provided by the Board 
unless the court determines that evidence was improperly excluded by the Board. In the present 
case, Appellant requested and received a hearing before the Fillmore City Board of Adjustment 
("the Board") at which time he, through counsel, presented evidence and argument regarding his 
position that the carport is not a structure under the Municipal Code's definition and that, 
alternatively, he was entitled to a variance. Because the district court was provided with a record 
of the hearing before the Board and there is no evidence that the Board improperly excluded 
evidence submitted by Appellant, Appellant's request to introduce new evidence before the 
district court should be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BOARD'S DETERMINATION THAT APPELLANT'S CARPORT IS A 
STRUCTURE AS DEFINED IN THE MUNICIPAL CODE IS REASONABLE 
AND IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
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Substantial evidence presented at a hearing before the Board supported the Board's 
reasonable determination that the Appellant's carport is a "structure" as defined in the Municipal 
Code. Section 10-9a-801 of the Utah Code Annotated provides the district court's standard of 
review of a Board of Adjustment's decision. See U.C.A. § 10-9a-801 (Supp. 2007). The statute 
provides that "[a] final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the 
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal." Id. at § 10-9a-801(3)(c). Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that a district court 
may find a decision of a Board of Adjustment arbitrary or capricious only if the decision was "so 
unreasonable" as to be labeled as such. See Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 
685 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1984). Additionally, when an administrative board's decision is 
challenged on appeal, "the Board's actions are generally accorded substantial deference, if 
exercised within the boundaries established by statute." See Wells v. Board of Adjustment 936 
P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) citing Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment. 893 
P.2d 602, 603-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (stating that within boundaries established by statute, the 
Board is generally afforded broad discretion and its decisions given a strong presumption of 
validity). 
In the present case, the Board correctly applied the relevant definitions found within the 
Municipal Code to the evidence presented by Appellant and made a reasonable determination 
that the carport is a structure. 
Structure is defined in the Municipal Code as "[a]nything constructed, the use of which 
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requires a fixed location on or in the ground, or attached to something having a fixed location on 
the ground and which imposes an impervious material on or above the ground." The definition 
also includes a "building." See Fillmore City Municipal Code, § 6-2. The word "building" is 
defined as "[a]ny structure, whether temporary or permanent, having a roof, and used or built for 
the shelter or enclosure of persons, animals, possessions, or property of any kind". See 
Municipal Code § 6-2. 
Counsel for Appellant concedes that the carport satisfies the first part of the definition of 
structure in that it is fixed to the ground. See Brief of the Appellant at p. 10. Appellant argues, 
nonetheless, that because the carport is not completely enclosed and allows "entrance or 
passage", it is not impervious, and therefore, not a structure under the second part of the 
definition. See Br. of Aplt. at p. 10. 
The definition of structure does not require that the thing being constructed be made 
completely impervious, or impenetrable, in order to qualify as a structure. Indeed, it is 
instructive that the definition uses the terms "impervious materiaF (emphasis added). At the 
hearing before the Board, Appellant described the carport as being a "metal shade" (R. 18: 32.) 
or "metal umbrella." (R. 19: 52.) The Board, in its decision, reasonably concluded that because 
the carport imposes an impervious material, i.e. metal, on or above the ground, it falls within the 
definition of the word "structure." 
Moreover, the definition of structure includes a "building" as defined in the Code. See 
Municipal Code § 6-2. Appellant concedes that the purpose of the carport is to "protect the 
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vehicles he parks under the covering from the weather and other natural elements." See Br. of 
Aplt. at p. 9. Appellant's own description of the carport falls squarely within the definition of a 
building, as it has a roof and is "used or built for the shelter or enclosure of persons, animals, 
possessions, or property of any kind." See Municipal Code § 6-2. Accordingly, the carport 
qualifies as a structure under the definition of that word in the Municipal Code. 
II. THE EVIDENCE APPELLANT PRESENTED BEFORE THE BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT FAILED TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A 
VARIANCE. 
Appellant argues that even if the carport falls within the definition of a structure under the 
Municipal Code and is, therefore, in violation of the setback requirement, he is nevertheless 
entitled to a variance. Appellant requested a variance at the hearing before the Board but failed 
to present sufficient evidence to establish that he was entitled to a variance. 
The requirements for a variance are set out in Utah Code Annotated § 10-9a-702: 
(2)(a) The appeal authority may grant a variance only if: 
(i) literal enforcement of the ordinance 
would cause an unreasonable hardship for the applicant that is not necessary 
to carry out the general purpose of the land use ordinances; 
(ii) there are special circumstances attached 
to the property that do not generally apply to other properties in the same 
zone; 
(iii) granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial 
property right possessed by other property in the same zone; 
(iv) the variance will not substantially affect the general plan and will not 
be contrary to the public interest; and 
(v) the spirit of the land use ordinance is 
observed and substantial justice done. 
The above requirements are also set out in § 6-5-6 of the Municipal Code. 
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A review of the record shows that the Board considered each of the requirements for a 
variance, applied those requirements to the evidence presented by Appellant and reasonably 
concluded that none of the requirements had been satisfied (R. 23-24: 239-306; 26-28: 392-464). 
First, the Board determined that the 25 foot setback requirement was adopted to further 
the health, safety and welfare of the community. (R. 23: 247-252). The Board determined that 
allowing the carport to encroach on the setback would not satisfy the first requirement absent a 
finding of unreasonable hardship by Appellant (Id.). 
Second, the Board determined that there are no special circumstances attached to the 
property (R. 27: 404-408). In Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, P.2d 1032, 
1036 (1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that in order to satisfy this requirement, a property 
owner must show "that the property itself contains some special circumstance that relates to the 
hardship complained of and that granting the variance to take this into account would not 
substantially affect the zoning plan." Appellant failed to present such evidence. In fact, the only 
evidence Appellant presented to support a finding of special circumstances is an assertion that 
the way the property has been developed somehow makes it unique, which conflicts with the 
Court's interpretation of special circumstances in Xanthos (R. 26: 364-369). 
Third, the Board determined that a denial of the variance would not deprive Appellant of 
privileges possessed by other property owner's in the same zone (R. 27: 423-437). Indeed, the 
Chairman of the Board noted that if the variance were granted, the Board would have to allow 
everyone in the zone the same privilege (R. 24: 282-285). 
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Fourth, the Board found that the setback requirement is in the public interest (R. 24: 288-
294). The Board noted both aesthetic and safety reasons to support a denial of the variance. 
Finally, the Board determined that Appellant failed to establish that the fifth requirement 
of the statute had been satisfied in that Appellant either knew or should have known the 
requirements of the Fillmore City zoning laws (R. 24: 296-306). 
Because the Board reasonably concluded that Appellant failed to present sufficient 
evidence to satisfy the requirements for a variance, the Board's decision should be upheld. 
III. APPELLANT WAS AFFORDED SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT 
EVIDENCE AND MAKE ARGUMENT BEFORE THE BOARD REGARDING 
HIS REQUEST FOR A VARIANCE AND IS, THEREFORE, BARRED FROM 
PRESENTING ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE REGARDING THE ISSUE BEFORE 
THE DISTRICT COURT. 
During the hearing before the Board, Appellant was provided sufficient opportunity to 
present evidence and make argument regarding his request for a variance. Upon appeal, the 
district court was provided with a true and correct transcript of the recording of the hearing 
before the Board. Accordingly, district court review of the Board's decision is limited to the 
record provided to the court. 
Section 10-9a-801 of the Utah Code Annotated provides the procedure for district court 
review of an appeal authority's land use decision. The law requires that the appeal authority 
"shall transmit to the reviewing court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes, 
findings, orders, and, if available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings." Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9a-801(7)(b) (2007). The statute also provides that "[i]f there is a record, the district 
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court's review is limited to the record provided by the land use authority or appeal authority" and 
that "[t]he court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of the land use 
authority or appeal authority . . . unless that evidence was offered to the land use authority or 
appeal authority, respectively, and the court determines that it was improperly excluded." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(a)(1), (ii) (2007). 
In his Brief, Appellant argues that he was denied the opportunity to introduce evidence to 
the Board regarding a variance and evidence was improperly excluded by the Board, and 
therefore, he is entitled to present such evidence before the district court on appeal. A review of 
the Transcript of the Proceedings, however, reveals that Appellant was afforded ample 
opportunity to present evidence and argument to the Board. Indeed, members of the Board were 
silent while Appellant took a significant amount of time at the beginning of the hearing to 
present his case (R. 18-20: 23-110). The Board remained silent until Appellant asked whether 
any of the members had questions (R. 20: 110). Appellant addressed the issue of a variance and 
made argument as to why he was entitled to one (R. 19: 67-99). After the Board addressed each 
of the requirements for a variance, Appellant was again provided an opportunity to address the 
Board's comments, answer questions raised by the Board and make additional argument prior to 
the Board's vote on the issue (R. 25-26: 329-386). Moreover, there is no evidence in the record 
that the Board improperly excluded evidence which was offered by Appellant. Accordingly, the 
district court's review of the Board's decision in limited to the record provided to the court. See 
Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction. Inc., v. West Jordan City, 2000 UT App. 49, 999 P.2d 1240 
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(holding that appellate review of a municipality's land use decision is limited to determining 
whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal) and Wells v. Board of Adjustment 936 
P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the district court's use of summary judgment to 
dispose of a petition to review a decision to grant a variance by the Board of Adjustment was 
appropriate because the district court's review of the board's decision was limited to the facts 
before the board). 
IV. APPELLANT WAS PROVIDED DUE PROCESS AT THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LEVEL, AND ACCORDINGLY, THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION TO 
EXCLUDE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE WAS APPROPRIATE. 
At the administrative level, due process requires only that a hearing be conducted at 
which an applicant is given the opportunity to present "evidence and contentions." See Peatross 
v. Board of Commissioners. 555 P.2d 283 (Utah 1976). Additionally, the Court in Peatross 
declared that: 
The standard rule is that appellate jurisdiction is the authority to review the actions or 
judgments of an inferior tribunal, and to affirm, modify or reverse such action or 
judgment. Correlated to this is the principle that ordinarily, where the lower tribunal, 
acting within the scope of its authority, has conducted a hearing and arrived at a decision, 
the reviewing court will examine only the certified record; and will not interfere with 
matters of discretion or upset the actions of the lower tribunal except upon a showing that 
the tribunal acted in excess of its authority or in a manner so clearly outside reason that its 
action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary. 
Id at 284. 
Applying the above principle, the Board conducted a hearing at which Appellant was 
provided the opportunity to present evidence and argument. There is no evidence that the Board 
improperly excluded evidence presented by Appellate. The district court was provided with a 
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transcript of the proceeding before the Board and correctly based its decision solely on the 
record. Accordingly, Appellate was not deprived of his right to due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's carport is in violation of the Municipal Code in that it falls squarely under the 
Municipal Code's definition of a structure, as it, according to Appellant, is constructed from an 
impervious material and its purpose is to protect his vehicle from the elements. Additionally, 
Appellant does not qualify for a variance as he is unable to establish that the requirements under 
the statute have been satisfied. Finally, district court review of the Board's decision is limited to 
the record that has been provided to the court as Appellant was provided an opportunity to 
present evidence and argument before the Board and there is no evidence that the Board 
improperly excluded evidence offered by the Appellant. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ S ^ day of December, 2009. 
fcn^. 
KA(ELA P. JACKg^N 
Fillmore City Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee were 
mailed first-class, postage prepaid, to James K. Slavens, attorney for Appellant, P.O. Box 752, 
Fillmore, Utah 84631, this day of December, 2009. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV Section 1: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
10-9a-702. Variances. 
(1) Any person or entity desiring a waiver or modification of the requirements of a land use 
ordinance as applied to a parcel of property that he owns, leases, or in which he holds some other 
beneficial interest may apply to the applicable appeal authority for a variance from the terms of 
the ordinance. 
(2) (a) The appeal authority may grant a variance only if: 
(i) literal enforcement of the ordinance would cause an unreasonable hardship for the 
applicant that is not necessary to carry out the general purpose of the land use ordinances; 
(ii) there are special circumstances attached to the property that do not generally apply to 
other properties in the same zone; 
(iii) granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial property right 
possessed by other property in the same zone; 
(iv) the variance will not substantially affect the general plan and will not be contrary to the 
public interest; and 
(v) the spirit of the land use ordinance is observed and substantial justice done. 
(b) (i) In determining whether or not enforcement of the land use ordinance would cause 
unreasonable hardship under Subsection (2)(a), the appeal authority may not find an 
unreasonable hardship unless the alleged hardship: 
(A) is located on or associated with the property for which the variance is sought; and 
(B) comes from circumstances peculiar to the property, not from conditions that are general 
to the neighborhood. 
(ii) In determining whether or not enforcement of the land use ordinance would cause 
unreasonable hardship under Subsection (2)(a), the appeal authority may not find an 
unreasonable hardship if the hardship is self-imposed or economic. 
(c) In determining whether or not there are special circumstances attached to the property 
under Subsection (2)(a), the appeal authority may find that special circumstances exist only if the 
special circumstances: 
(i) relate to the hardship complained of; and 
(ii) deprive the property of privileges granted to other properties in the same zone. 
© 2009 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the 
restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
(3) The applicant shall bear the burden of proving that all of the conditions justifying a 
variance have been met. 
(4) Variances run with the land. 
(5) The appeal authority may not grant a use variance. 
(6) In granting a variance, the appeal authority may impose additional requirements on the 
applicant that will: 
(a) mitigate any harmful affects of the variance; or 
(b) serve the purpose of the standard or requirement that is waived or modified. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-707, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 235, § 39; 1992, ch. 23, § 19; 
renumbered by L. 2005, ch. 254, § 62. 
Amendment Notes. - The 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 10-9-707; substituted "a land use ordinance" for "the zoning ordinance" in 
Subsection (1) and "appeal authority" for "board of adjustment" and "zone" for "district" wherever they 
appeared in the section; and made minor stylistic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
Authority of city council. 
Purchaser's awareness of noncompliance. 
Required findings. 
Showing required for variance. 
Variance allowed. 
Authority of city council. 
An ordinance making the city council, rather than the Board of Adjustment, the decision-making 
authority with regard to the granting of variances, and making the statutory 30-day appeal period nearly 
impossible to meet by requiring that the variance applicant seek approval from the planning commission 
and the city council, violated former § 10-9-12. Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1986). 
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10-9a-801. No district court review until administrative remedies exhausted - Time for 
filing - Tolling of time - Standards governing court review - Record on review - Staying of 
decision. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision made under 
this chapter, or under a regulation made under authority of this chapter, until that person has 
exhausted the person's administrative remedies as provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority and 
Variances, if applicable. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or in 
violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the 
district court within 30 days after the local land use decision is final. 
(b) (i) The time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition is tolled from the date a property 
owner files a request for arbitration of a constitutional taking issue with the property rights 
ombudsman under Section 13-43-204 until 30 days after: 
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award; or 
(B) the property rights ombudsman issues a written statement under Subsection 
13-43-204(3)(b) declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator. 
(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the specific constitutional taking 
issue that is the subject of the request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman by 
a property owner. 
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman after the time under 
Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition has expired does not affect the time to file a petition. 
(3) (a) The courts shall: 
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of this chapter 
is valid; and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. 
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative discretion is 
valid if it is reasonably debatable that the decision, ordinance, or regulation promotes the 
purposes of this chapter and is not otherwise illegal. 
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the decision is 
supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
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(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, ordinance, or 
regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was made or the 
ordinance or regulation adopted. 
(4) The provisions of Subsection (2)(a) apply from the date on which the municipality takes 
final action on a land use application for any adversely affected third party, if the municipality 
conformed with the notice provisions of Part 2, Notice, or for any person who had actual notice 
of the pending decision. 
(5) If the municipality has complied with Section 10-9a-205, a challenge to the enactment of 
a land use ordinance or general plan may not be filed with the district court more than 30 days 
after the enactment. 
(6) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the appeal authority's decision 
is final. 
(7) (a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit to the 
reviewing court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes, findings, orders, and, if 
available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings. 
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape recording is a true and correct 
transcript for purposes of this Subsection (7). 
(8) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record provided by 
the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be. 
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of the land use 
authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that evidence was offered to the land use 
authority or appeal authority, respectively, and the court determines that it was improperly 
excluded. 
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence. 
(9) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the land use authority or authority 
appeal authority, as the case may be. 
(b) (i) Before filing a petition under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of a 
constitutional taking issue under Section 13-43-204, the aggrieved party may petition the appeal 
authority to stay its decision. 
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the appeal authority may order its decision stayed 
pending district court review if the appeal authority finds it to be in the best interest of the 
municipality. 
(iii) After a petition is filed under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of a 
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constitutional taking issue is filed under Section 13-43-204, the petitioner may seek an injunction 
staying the appeal authority's decision. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-1001, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 235, § 53; 1992, ch. 30, § 13; 1999, ch. 
291, § 3; 2003, ch. 124, § 3; 2004, ch. 223, § 2; renumbered by L. 2005, ch. 254, § 69; 2007, 
ch. 306, § 7; 2007, ch. 363, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. - The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, added "or in violation of in 
Subsection (2)(a). 
The 2004 amendment, effective May 3, 2004, substituted "property rights" for "private property" 
throughout Subsection (2)(b) and made stylistic changes. 
The 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 
10-9-1001; added "as provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority and Variances, if applicable" in Subsection (1); 
in Subsection (2)(a), substituted "a final decision" for "any decision" and "local land use decision is final" 
for "local land use decision is rendered"; substituted "a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the 
authority of this chapter is valid" for "land use decisions and regulations are valid" in Subsection (3)(a)(i); 
added "ordinance, or regulation" in Subsection (3)(a)(ii); added Subsections (3)(b)-(9); and made stylistic 
changes. 
The 2007 amendment by ch. 306, effective April 30, 2007, substituted "Subsection 13-43-204(3)(b)" 
for "Subsection 63-34-13(4)" in Subsection (2)(b)(i)(B) and substituted "Section 13-43-204" for "Section 
63-34-13" throughout the section. 
The 2007 amendment by ch. 363, effective April 30, 2007, substituted the language beginning "if it is 
reasonably debatable" for "if the decision, ordinance, or regulation is reasonably debatable and not illegal" 
in Subsection (3)(b). 
This section has been reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 




Burden of proof. 
City may not circumvent procedure. 
Constitutional challenges to zoning. 
Construction and application. 
Effect of failure to appeal. 
Limits of discretion. 
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lubricants, at which the customer provides the service to his own vehicle, and at which no vehicle repair 
or maintenance service is offered. Such an establishment may offer for sale at retail other convenience 
items as a clearly secondary activity. Stations located at interstate exchanges catering to semi-trucks, 
which also include accommodations for truckers, also known as truck stops, require a conditional use 
permit. 
Automotive Service Station. An establishment whose primary purpose is the retail sale of gasoline or 
other motor vehicle and related fuel, oil, or lubricant. Secondary activities may include minor automotive 
repair, maintenance, or automatic car wash. 
Aviation Airport Services. Area containing an aviation landing strip, runway, hanger or other related 
services needed for aircraft. 
Balcony. A platform that projects from the wall of a Building and is enclosed by a railing, parapet or 
balustrade. 
Banking or Financial Service. A bank, credit union, savings and loan association, or other 
establishment with a primary purpose of receiving, lending, exchanging, or safeguarding money, or 
performing financial advisory service. This definition shall include outside drive-up facilities for service 
to customers in automobiles. 
Bar, Tavern, Lounge, and Club. An establishment intended primarily for the on-premises sale and 
consumption of alcoholic beverages, open either to the public or operated as a nonprofit private club for 
members only. 
Basement. A story whose floor is more than 12 inches below the average level of the adjoining ground, 
but where no more than half of its floor-to-ceiling height is below the average contact level of the 
adjoining ground. A basement shall be counted as a story for purposes of height measurement and as 
a half-story for purposes of side-yard determination. 
Bed and Breakfast, A building where, for compensation, meals and lodging are provided for at least 
five but not more than 15 persons. 
Board of Adjustment. A five (5) member board appointed by the Fillmore City Council as provided in 
this ordinance. 
Bond, Public Improvement. A one (1) year guarantee to the City that all public improvements have 
been installed to City specifications and will operate properly. 
Building. Any structure, whether temporary or permanent, having a roof, and used or built for the 
shelter or enclosure of persons, animals, possessions, or property of any kind. 
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Street, Private. A right-of-way or easement in private ownership, not dedicated or maintained as a public 
street, which affords the principal means of access to two or more lots. 
Street, Public. A street that has been dedicated to and accepted by the City Council; that the City has 
acquired and accepted by prescriptive right; or that the City owns in fee. A public thoroughfare, which 
affords principal, means of access to abutting property and has a right-of-way that exceeds 26 feet in width. 
The term street shall include avenue, drive, circle, road, parkway, boulevard, highway, thoroughfare, or any 
other similar term. 
Street, Subcoilector. A street which conveys traffic to more dwellings and includes through traffic 
between access streets and collectors. Usual ADT range is 250-1,000 vehicles. 
Streetscape. The distinguishing characteristics of a particular street including paving materials, 
adjacent space on both sides of the street, landscaping, retaining walls, sidewalks, building facades, 
lighting, medians, street furniture and signs. 
Structure. Anything constructed, the use of which requires a fixed location on or in the ground, or 
attached to something having a fixed location on the ground and which imposes an impervious material 
on or above the ground; definition includes "Building". 
Structure, Pre-existing. A structure, which was legally constructed prior to (date of adoption). 
Structural Alterations. Any change in the supporting members of a building, such as bearing walls, 
columns, beams, or girders. 
Subdivision. Any land, vacant or improved, whjcMs div[ded or proposed to be divided into two (2) or 
more LoTs,~Farcels^ Brte,~Units, plots, or other division of land for the purpose, whether immediate or 
future, for offer, sale, lease, or Development, either on the installment plan or upon any and all other 
residential and nonresidential zoned land, whether by deed, metes and bounds description, devise and 
testacy, lease, map, plat, or other recorded instrument. 
1.2 "Subdivision" does not include: 
A. A bona fide division or partition of agricultural land for the purpose of joining one of the resulting 
separate parcels to a contiguous parcel of unsubdivided agricultural land, if neither the resulting 
combined parcel nor the parcel remaining from the division or partition violates an applicable zoning 
ordinance; 
B. A recorded agreement between owners of adjoining properties adjusting their mutual boundary 
if: 
1. No new lot is created; and 
2. The adjustment does not result in a violation of applicable zoning ordinances; or 
CHAPTER 6- 5 BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
5. Proceedings and hearings before the Board of Adjustment shall be had pursuant to rules 
adopted by the Board of Adjustment and in conformance with general principles of due 
process. Any party in interest may appear at such hearing in person, by agent, or by an 
attorney of his/her choice. 
6. The person or entity making the appeal has the burden of proving that an error has been 
made. 
B. 1. Only decisions applying the zoning ordinance may be appealed to the Board of Adjustment. 
2. A person may not appeal, and the Board of Adjustment may not consider, any zoning 
ordinance amendments. 
3. The City Council shall hear and decide appeals from Planning Commission decisions 
regarding conditional use permits. 
C. Appeals may not be used to waive or modify the terms or requirements of the zoning ordinance. 
6-5-5 VARIANCE. Any person or entity desiring a waiver or modification of the requirements of the 
zoning ordinance as applied to a parcel of property that he/she owns, leases, or in which 
he/she holds some other beneficial interest may apply to the Board of Adjustment for a 
variance from the terms of the zoning ordinance. 
6-5-6 STANDARDS. 
A. The Board of Adjustment may grant a variance only if each of the following conditions are met: 
1. Literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance would cause an unreasonable hardship for the 
applicant that is not necessary to carry out the general purpose of the zoning ordinance; 
2. There are special circumstances attached to the property that do not generally apply to 
other properties in the same district; 
3. Granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial property right possessed 
by other property in the same district; 
4. The variance will not substantially affect the general plan and will not be contrary to the 
public interest; and 
5. The spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed and substantial justice done. 
B. In determining whether or not enforcement of the zoning ordinance would cause unreasonable 
hardship under subsection A, above, the Board of Adjustment may not find an unreasonable 
hardship unless the alleged hardship: 
1. Is located on or associated with the property for which the variance is sought; and 
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2. Comes from circumstances peculiar to the property, not from conditions that are general to 
the neighborhood. 
C. In determining whether or not enforcement of the zoning ordinance would cause unreasonable 
hardship under subsection A, above, the Board of Adjustment may not find an unreasonable 
hardship if the hardship is self-imposed or economic. 
D. In determining whether or not there are special circumstances attached to the property under 
subsection A, above, the Board of Adjustment may find that special circumstances exist only if 
the special circumstances: 
1. Relate to the hardship complained of; and 
2. Deprive the property of privileges granted to other properties in the same district. 
E. The applicant shall bear the burden of proving all of the conditions justifying a variance have 
been met. 
F. Variances run with the land. 
G. The Board of Adjustment and any other body may not grant use variances. 
H. In granting a variance, the Board of Adjustment may impose additional requirements on the 
applicant that will: 
1. Mitigate any harmful affects of the variance; or 
2. Serve the purpose of the standard or requirement that is waived or modified. 
6-5-7 BUILDING PERMITS. The Building Official shall not issue any building permit for any 
building, construction or repair of any building unless such fully conforms to all zoning 
regulations or ordinances of this municipality in effect at the time of application. No permit shall 
issue for any building or structure or part thereof on any land located between the mapped 
lines of any street as shown on any official street map adopted by the governing body. 
6-5-8 NOTICE TO COUNCIL OF VARIANCE OR BUILDING PERMIT APPLICATION. Before any 
application for a variance or building permit is heard by the Board of Adjustment, the Board of 
Adjustment shall give Fillmore City at least fifteen (15) days notice of any hearing to consider 
the application. 
. 6-5-9 ZONE BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENT. Where a zone boundary line divides a lot in a single 
ownership at the time of the passage of this chapter, the Board may permit a use authorized on 
either portion of such lotto extend not more than fifty feet (501) into the other portion of the lot. 
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Type Allowed j Administrative j Conditional 
Conditional Use Use 
Business License 
Office, Business, Gov 
Office, Professional 









Repair Services, Small App 
6-7-8.3 DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS 
Table 6-7-8 .3 Minimum Lot and Development Standards 





j 7,500sf i 75' 
i| Front: 25' 
ii Side: 8' 
\\ Rear: 20' 
;! Accessory Structure: 25* Front/ 3' 
H Side 
!! 35' 
; Two Family 
j Dwelling 
ii Front: 25' 
i! Side: 8' 
9,000 sf ;j 90' ij Rear: 20' 
W Accessory Structure: 25'Front/3' 










Any portion of | 
sidewalk | 
required over | 
150' is eligible to | 
participate in the | 
Fillmore City | 
cost sharing J 
program for the | 
construction of | 
that portion of | 
; thes sidewalk I 
Yes I 
ii Front: 25' 
i ii ii Side: 8' 
j Commercial i 7, 500sf i; 90' ii Rear: 20' 
ii Accessory Structure: 25'Front / 3' 
i ii ii Side 
35' Yes 
1. Erection of more than one principal structure on the lot. 
More than one structure housing a permitted prindpal use, may be erected on a single lot provided 
that yard setbacks and other requirements of this ordinance shall be met for each structure. 
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2. Structure to have access. 
All structures shall be on a lot adjacent to a public street or with access to an approved private 
street, and shall be so located on lots as to provide safe and convenient access for fire protection. 
3. Farm Animals/Livestock. Livestock, fowl and other animals (excluding household pets) that 
may, where permitted, be kept, bred and maintained with the following restrictions: 
a. Livestock. One animal for every 5,000 sq ft of property, (excluding occupied structures) 
one horse, cow, pig, llama, goat or (5) sheep. Unaltered male goats are not allowed other 
than on a temporary basis for breeding purposes. The offspring of livestock may be kept 
without consideration of the space limitations until the animal is weaned or not to exceed 6 
months. 
b. Other farm animals. For each 5000 sq ft of property, (excluding occupied structures) five 
rabbit or fowl or other similar small animals may be kept. 100 rabbits or fowl may be kept in 
an enclosed structure with a roof and walls on all sides. The offspring kept in the enclosed 
structure shall not exceed 200 and may be kept for a period of 6 months. One enclosed 
structure maybe kept for every 5,000 sq ft of property (excluding occupied structures). 
c. Animals stabled or housed in enclosed areas. Any building, structure or corral in which 
livestock is kept must be at least 50 feet from any street, dwelling, or sidewalk. This 





Table 6-7-8.4 Fencing 
[Setbacks' ijHeight :| Wiidlife/ 
j! ij Large Animal \ 
\ Front: 3' \\ Front: 4' 
| Side: 3' ;l Side: 6* 
j Exception: 25' ij Rear: 6' 
I Front for electric ij 
j fence jl 
i jAdministrative 




Corner Lot i | 
Administrative i | 
Conditional Use ; ! 
6-7-8.5 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: The operation of any use permitted in this district is 
subject to the following standards of performance: 
1. All uses must be operated so that all practical means are used to confine any noise, odor, 
dust, smoke, vibration or other similar feature to the premises upon which they are located. 
2. Any light used to illuminate signs, parking areas, or for any other purpose shall be so 
arranged as to confine direct light beams to the lighted property by appropriate directional 
hooding. 
6-7-8.6 PARKING: Parking standards in Section 6-7.10. Parking, also apply to the following on-site 
parking requirements: 
_ Ta.b,?..6"7.^6..P.?rk!n9 
f '11..I f^ ^ZZ'ZI...'!...' LZIIZZZZZZZ^^ 
ijApartment House ;j3 spaces per 1,666 square feet 
i |G r o u p Home <Tne Skater of: 1 space per 2 bedrooms plus 1 space per employee 
| jiper shift, or 2 per 3 employees per shift 
fCtiHd Care Facility/Center i|1 space per on-duty employee and 1 per 6 children 
|Dweiling, Single Family :j2.5 spaces per Dwelling Unit (min. 167 sf per space) 
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TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
1 FILLMORE CITY 
2 BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
3 July 31,2008 
4 
5 TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
6 
7 Present: 
8 Chair: EricLarsen 
9 Zoning Adm: Lisa Crosland 
10 Secretary: Teresa Alldredge 
11 
12 
13 Others: Larry Peterson, Lee Day, Attorney James Slavens, Thad Stevens 
14 
15 Counter 001 Time 7:05 p.m. July 31, 2008 
16 
17 Eric Larsen: Ok, We are convening this Board of Adjustment tonight to hear the 
18 appeal for a variance by Thad Stevens, a.... the reason for the Appeal it says is 
19 the definition of quote "structure" and the denial of the permit. And so we will 
20 begin by hearing from Mr. Slavens or Thad, whichever., ok ..if you would like to 
21 come up to the, whatever that is, podium. 
22 
23 James K. Slavens: Thank you, a.. I think the appeal may be a little big broader 
24 than that. a... the., let me kind of explain why I think that... the., well, just as a 
25 little background why this is before you folks, Thad has purchased a glorified 
26 "umbrella" I use that term because it best fits the position I am trying to take.. It 
27 was something that was sold locally, he bought it, secured it to his driveway that 
28 functions as a shade for his vehicle. I am going to pass these pictures around so 
29 you can kinda see what I am talking about. While that is being passed around, 
30 the development standards regarding the zoning requirements indicate you 
31 cannot have a structure within 25 feet of the front of the property. This a., this 
32 metal shade goes within that period of time, so I think it kinda hinges on what 
33 "structure" means, because what the zoning requirements say that you can't 
34 have a structure within 25 feet, so I think the first determination is whether or not 
35 this thing qualifies as a structure as defined in the definitions. Chapter 6-2 
36 defines structure as the following: 
37 
38 " anything constructed, (comma) the use of which requires a fixed 
39 location on or in the ground or attached to something having a fixed location on 
40 or in the ground " I think it fits that part of the definition... then it says..." and 
41 which imposes an impervious material on or above the ground;(semi colon) 






44 So I understand on structure you gotta know what "impervious" means and I 
45 (inaudible ) and I didn't know what impervious means and I don't know that I still 
46 do, or whether I do now. I did look up impervious in the dictionary in Marion 
47 Webster's Dictionary on line, and it defines it as " not allowing entrance or 
48 passage; impenetrable. I don't think this a.... metal... a structure fits that 
49 definition of structure - it's not - you can walk right through it. And as you can 
50 see we have Thad in his truck there and you can see, you can see through the 
51 structure the view's not obstructed as far as the sidewalk and streets are 
52 concerned. So that's the reason we don't think that.. that...metal umbrella fits 
53 the definition of the a "structure". 
54 
55 Impenetrable - 1 looked that word up in the dictionary as well and it means 
56 "incapable of being penetrated or pierced", I don't think... you can walk right 
57 through it...you can walk from one side to the other side, the outside to the 
58 outside other side without, a.. I mean there is a way to do it, which is different 
59 from a building. I think the definition of the word structure uses the building as 
60 kind of an example of what it talks about - a building is something that we have 
61 here, where you go through a door where you get through the building. There is 
62 no, I mean, its not enclosed all the way around .A... so that's the reason that we 
63 think this should not be defined as a structure as it has been applied and that 
64 restriction of being within 25 feet. That's the first aspect of why we think that we 
65 should be allowed a building permit. 
66 
67 The second aspect is the variance of Chapter 6-5 gives a criteria of when a 
68 variance should be a... allowed., a the first criteria .. it says each of the following, 
69 so each of these criteria have to be reached to be able to meet the variance. 
70 
71 The first one is basically an "unreasonable hardship" and if you look at the 
72 property there in those pictures, his house goes within two feet from the property 
73 line and 5 feet on the other side. So, this is the only way that he could have 
74 someway to protect his vehicle from the elements, so I think it would impose 
75 unreasonable hardship, special circumstances is the same thing ....there is no 
76 place to put a garage...a... There is no place that would meet this criteria within 
77 25 feet for him to have some sort of protection against his vehicles. 
78 
79 It is essential to the enjoyment of his property - again the same thing... a..he 
80 wants to be able to protect his vehicle from the weather and he needs that to be 
81 able to ..a.... protect his vehicles from snow, rain, and other things that may do 
82 damage to his vehicle..a...the fourth one is that is will not substantially affect the 
83 general plan., if you look at that.that on first (inaudible) it may look like criteria 
84 could not be met but he is willing to take that fence down so that would actually 
85 increase... so that he could see down that road....I think there is a general 
86 interest in protecting people that are walking down the sidewalk from people that 
87 are backing up and he is wiling to take that fence down so that he can keep the 
88 shelter for his vehicle, a... and then the spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed 
89 and substantial justice is done for the same reasons I have already articulated I 
90 
91 Counter #58 
92 
93 think that would be justice., he has already purchased this, he didn't know 
94 anything about the restrictions when he put that up, and so that if you can find 
95 that it does meet the definition of structure, he has to have a 
96 variance (inaudible) the shelter there. He has gone to quite a bit of expense 
97 purchasing it and making sure that the wind or something didn't cause it to blow 
98 off and to cause property damage. We have it looked at from Sunrise, someone 
99 who came over and looked at it? ... 
100 
101 Thad Stevens: He told me that 
102 
103 James K. Slavens: Jason, right. Jason came and - the building inspector 
104 checked the specs that came with it to make sure that it would stand, of course 
105 you know we have had some pretty tough wind storms the last little bit and it.. 
106 hasn't been any problems. So I think there is no safety issues that have to be 
107 concerned. It is bolted down tightly so there can't be blown or cause damage to 
108 other structure... it is bolted down... 
109 
110 I could answer any questions that you may have about our position. 
I l l 
112 Eric Larsen: Are there any questions for Mr.... 
113 
114 (pictures are passed around) 
115 
116 Debbie Jackson: Is this a garage? 
117 
118 James K. Slaves: No... Yes.. 
119 
120 Debbie Jackson: Is it part of the house? 
121 
122 Thad Stevens: Yes, and there is also a variance given on that garage and there 
123 is a patio across the home and a variance on that one. 
124 
125 Debbie Jackson: so the part that is close to the property line, is it a garage? 
126 
127 Thad Stevens: uh huh. Yes. But my truck is a one ton and that garage has a real 




132 Wendell Robison: Now if I understand, the carport was installed after the City 
133 ordinance of 25 feet had been enacted. Is that correct? 
134 
135 James K. Slavens: I don't think so.... That is how is has always been.(turned to 
136 zoning administrator for response) 
137 
138 Lisa Crosland: The structure was installed after the ordinance was in effect, yes. 
139 
140 Wendell Robison: And you are claiming that it is not a structure because it is 
141 moveable? 
142 
143 James K. Slavens: No, I think it does meet the first part of the definition, I think 
144 there are two parts to the definition and I think the first one is, the first part of that 
145 is that it is a fixed location on or in the ground, or is attached to something 
146 having a fixed location on the ground, it is attached to the concrete there, so I 
147 think it is attached - it would have to be attached or it would blow away. I think 
148 the part that it does not meet is the second part of that is imposes impervious 
149 material, and I think that the fact that if you put that picture, you can just walk 
150 right through it, and it is not impervious. 
151 
152 Marty Lunt: Is the top impervious? 
153 
154 James K. Slavens: the top would be. Yes. 
155 
156 Marty Lunt; So is that part of the structure? 
157 
158 James K. Slavens: be part of it, yes. 
159 
160 Marty Lunt: So the first part is a structure, and the second part is a structure. 
161 
162 James K. Slavens: No, I think you have to look at it as a whole. I mean, it is the 
163 whole function of the unit. I think you have to look at the function of the unit. 
164 
165 Marty Lunt. So if you are saying the first part is a structure, I don't understand 
166 how you are saying the second part isn't part of the structure. 
167 
168 James K. Slavens: ok, I guess the best way to ask the question is when would 
169 that ever become important then? because, I mean, you would just have air 
170 there. If you didn't have something that is impervious, you would just have air 
171 there, you would have nothing. So you wouldn't need the word impervious. 
172 
173 Marty Lunt - right, (inaudible) so would you say it is a structure? 
174 
175 James K. Slavens: I don't. I think you can use the word structure to describe it, I 
176 think even when I was talking I talked about a structure, but to me it is more of a 
177 shelter, it's more of... the fact that it is impervious 
178 
179 Marty Lunt - so did you say that it is bolted down 
180 
181 James K. Slavens: It is. So, if you look at both parts of the definition, and it said 
182 and, it didn't say or, ah, so I think both parts of that have to be met to qualify as a 
183 structure. 
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185 
186 Debbie Jackson: It sure sounds impervious to me. It says - (inaudible) 
187 impervious material on or above the ground - impervious is above the ground 
188 - it entirely meets the definition, if that is the discussion I gather (inaudible) 
189 
190 James K. Slavens: There's. I just.... One of the a... in the law, one of the things 
191 they use for statutory interpretation is you have to give meaning for the 
192 definition, and, a... if, when would you have any material there that you'd even 
193 be discussing structure if it didn't mean the whole thing, that you couldn't walk 
194 through the thing?a.... 
195 
196 Wendell Robison: But walking through it is not the only thing that you would 
197 qualify for impervious. 
198 
199 James K. Slavens: the only thing that I can see in case law would be mines. 
200 They say that mines are not... if water can go through the mines then it is not 
201 impervious, but you have to have something there to determine, I mean, 
202 otherwise how would you ever discuss whether it is impervious? There would 
203 have to be nothing there for pervious to ever become important. 
204 
205 Eric Larsen: We are not talking about impervious everything. We are talking 
206 about impervious material, and steel is an impervious material. 
207 
208 James K. Slavens - yeah, I am not doing a very good - let me at least get to 
209 the comfort that I , you know what I am trying to say, and I am not doing a very 
210 good job of it, The only time you would even discuss whether ...there would have 
211 to be some material there - unless I don't know a net, I guess if there were a 
212 net there would that ....then.. I don't know if you would ever have to discuss with 
213 a net - if you went up there and cut little holes in the roof that would make it 
214 impervious? 
215 
216 Eric Larsen - No, we are talking about impervious material. Material used it can 
217 be made of swiss cheese, if the material is impervious, it would qualify as 
218 impervious, it doesn't matter how many holes, open windows, or open doors you 
219 have, it is a structure by definition, as I read it, which is made out of impervious 
220 material - and that could be wood, that could be glass, or that could be 
221 plexiglas, plastic .. the material that is used is impervious, it doesn't mean that it 
222 is totally secure and a bunker and a bullet proof or anything like that. 
223 
224 James K. Slavens - so the awnings over the porch would be a violation? 
225 (inaudible) 
226 
227 Eric Larsen - And I guess we won't be the first ones to deny that there has been 
228 a mistake in the past but we have to stop somewhere and say we have got to 
229 deal with what we have got. 
230 
231 James K. Slavens: Based on that, I think, (laughs) I think that the main thing we 
232 want to argue is that a variance (inaudible) you meet characteristics of the house 
233 itself and property itself justifies a variance and he is willing to address any 
234 concerns that you folks may have about the safety issues (inaudible - fence) I 
235 can see that being a real safety issue, concern to you folks and he is willing to 
236 take that down and do something with that fence so that any concerns that way 
237 would be satisfied. 
238 
239 Eric Larsen: Ok, a., the criteria that we operate under is by statute granted to the 
240 City by the State of Utah, and they also impose upon us as a body, as a board, 
241 that there are five criteria, and if any one of those is in question, no variance can 
242 be granted. So let's look at those one by one. 
243 
244 Literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance would cause an unreasonable 
245 hardship for the applicant that is not necessary to carry out the purpose of the 
246 zoning - general purpose of the zoning ordinance - so then we have to look at 
247 what the zoning ordinance is all about. Why do they have the 25 foot setback? 
248 And again, those,a.. that part of the ordinance is granted to the state - granted 
249 to the City by the State, in fact I believe it is recommended that everyone in 
250 residential areas have 25 foot setbacks, I might be wrong, but I believe that is 
251 the case. So we have to look at the general purpose of the zoning ordinance and 
252 why it is there, and sure it is the health, safety, and welfare of the community. 
253 
254 Debbie Jackson: May I say something? 
255 
256 Eric Larsen: Yes. 
257 
258 Debbie Jackson: We are talking about the 25 foot setback, but there is also an 8 
259 foot side setback and this has a three foot, and you mention that when the home 
260 was built, that was allowed at the time, but I think that is a real issue too if you 
261 are talking about setbacks, there isn't the 8 feet to the side as well, and that 
262 aggravates that in addition I think. 
263 
264 Eric Larsen: Ok. So there is the two issues, both of them are set back one from 
265 the front and one from the side. We will come back and go through all these 
266 again. 
267 
268 There are special circumstances attached to the property that do not generally 
269 apply to other properties in the same district That would be things that would be 
270 unique about the property. Uh.. hillsides that apply to that property only and no 
271 body else around there, or, a utility underground pipe of some kind that would 
272 cause shifting of the house from one side of the property to the other, that no 
273 one else would have in that particular area. It has to be something unique about 
274 the property that zoning that is applied in that general area, the uniqueness of 
275 that piece or property has to be unique, one of a kind. A.... and based on the 
276 footages that I saw here that was 78' frontage, looks like more on the south end, 
277 I think there are other properties in that area that are probably about that same 
278 size or even smaller, so the uniqueness, I don't see anything unique or someone 
279 else can point that out to me. 
280 
281 Number three: Granting the variance is substantial to the enjoyment of a 
282 substantial property right observed by other property in the same district. Well, if 
283 we granted this structure to remain, a... violating the zoning ordinance, then we 
284 would have to open it up to everybody, and we would come up with all kinds of 
285 impervious materials to deal with...a.. 
286 
287 Number four: the variance will not substantially affect the general plan and will 
288 not be contrary to the public interest. The twenty five foot setback is in the public 
289 interest, it's one of those things that they have had allowed zoning to continue 
290 because it affects the health, safety and welfare of the community. Property 
291 values are affected when people start to encroach clear out to the public 
292 sidewalk, it's allowed in the business district, but the beauties of the residential 
293 area can be blurred quite a bit by encroaching on that area, besides the safety 
294 aspect. 
295 
296 And number five is spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed and substantial 
297 justice is done. When you look at all five of those, I have a hard time seeing that 
298 it qualifies for any of the five, based on what my understanding about the zoning 
299 laws and the uniqueness of the property and what you have built there and the 
300 hardship, you know I mean, the law says you either knew or should have known 
301 that there were zoning laws, it was published a long time ago and you can't ..it 
302 makes it difficult when the City has to try to send a letter to everybody 
303 anticipating that they are going to start building something because they never 
304 know. That is what the law says....it was either known, or should have been 
305 known. It is not the City's responsibility to make sure that everyone has that 
306 mailed to them every time they are thinking of building something. 
307 
308 Is there any other comments or? Wendell? 
309 
310 Wendell Robinson: I think you have done an excellent job on the presentation. 
311 It has been understandable. I just have one clarification that I need made 
312 though, and that's in regarding the structure on the property. To me it really 
313 doesn't matter whether it is impervious or not, that just might be an item that was 
314 in one of the regulation as and we expanded on it, quite a bit, but I think that it 
315 boils down to the real issue uncovering everything else is does it meet the 25 
316 foot setback, and to me I think I need things just as simple as they can be., and 
317 to me that is the crux of the program here. 
318 
319 Judy Huntsman: I have a question. When you got the variance for the house 
320 was that under a non-conforming variance? 
321 
322 Eric Larsen: How long ago was that variance? 
323 
324 Thad Stevens: A about'83. 
325 
326 Judy Huntsman: If it was a non-conforming variance you can't add anything else 
327 into that variance, (inaudible) 
328 
329 James K. Slavens: I do. I think that would be true if you want to build closer to 
330 that property line, it just affects that variance. 
331 
332 Judy Huntsman: You can't add anything to a non-conforming variance. 
333 
334 James K. Slavens: That's just not my..my understanding is that you can have 
335 more than one variance on a property for different ordinances. You just can't get 
336 a variance and add things to that. You see that variance was just within the 
337 property line...on that...on that 
338 
339 Judy Huntsman: It looks like it was not attached to your house, (inaudible) I 
340 couldn't tell... 
341 
342 Eric Larsen: Ok, any other questions? 
343 
344 Marty Lunt: I think is a nice structure (inaudible) setback issue (inaudible) 
345 probably nice like you said to keep your truck sheltered and stuff like that, but. 
346 We have to follow the rules, I guess (inaudible) 
347 
348 Thad Stevens: If there is a safety hazard involved it is that fence, not the 
349 carport. 
350 
351 James K. Slavens: I think, the thing, that I think differentiates this is the fact that 
352 you can see through it, I mean, a... that it is an umbrella, and I can see .. a.. I 
353 don't think it distracts from the neighborhood, a... 
354 
355 Eric Larsen: That is your opinion though... thats 
356 
357 James K. Slavens: I see a lot over here that just really bothers me, I mean I 
358 think normal standards, it's well made, its not some 2x4, 3 or 4 2x4's hooked 
359 together and a piece of plywood, so there is nothing, there is nothing obnoxious 
360 about this structure itself and I think the thing that takes it out of that structure 
361 definition is if you look at, I mean, the typical meaning of structure is, you know a 
362 house, an out building, something that has doors and windows you can't walk 
363 through you can't see through, and this you can see through almost as well as if 
364 it weren't there, and so I think the uniqueness aspect of it isn't limited to a.... the 
365 property itself, the physical characteristics of the property, I think the way it has 
366 been developed can also make it unique and so I think this is a unique a... piece 
367 of property by the way it is built, so I don't think that uniqueness is limited to just 
368 the natural characteristics of the property, I think you know., what we have talked 
369 about... I think that the way it has been developed is also unique. 
370 
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372 
373 Eric Larsen: The uniqueness of it though is not something that we look at in 
374 terms of the way it was developed, it has to be for us to grant it, it has to be 
375 unique to that property because of certain conditions, like a steep hillside, like a 
376 utility line, like an odd piece shaped of property. There is nothing odd about it. 
377 That's the criteria that we have to go on. 
378 
379 James K. Slavens: And I respectfully disagree with that. I understand that this is 
380 your opinion, 
381 
382 Eric Larsen: That is not my opinion, it is state code. The guidelines that were 
383 given by the state. 
384 
385 James K. Slavens: Do you have a cite on that? 'cause that's not the way I read 
386 it. I mean it's, I don't think uniqueness has to be a natural thing. 
387 
388 Eric Larsen: All the trainings that I have gone to that have been put on by the 
389 State, that is what they have said, and so...So, we have heard the argument let 
390 me go through these one by one I will ask for a motion on each one of these: 
391 
392 #1 Literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance would cause an 
393 unreasonable hardship for the applicant that is not necessary to carry out 
394 the general purpose of the zoning ordinance. I need a motion whether or not 
395 that would pass or fail. 
396 
397 Marty Lunt: Move to fail. 
398 
399 Eric Larsen: Marty has made the motion that it fails, all in favor say aye: 
400 
401 (Audible response is a collective AYE) Any opposed (no response) 
402 
403 
404 Number two: #2 There are special circumstances attached to the property 
405 that do not generally apply to other properties in the same district - I 
406 would accept a motion on that. 
407 
408 Wendell Robison: I make a motion that it does not. 
409 
410 Eric Larsen: Wendell has made the motion that it does not. I guess I need a 
411 second to that motion. 
412 
413 Debbie Jackson: Second. 
414 
415 Eric Larsen: Debbie seconds it. I probably should back up, and did we get a 
416 second to the first motion? on number one? 
417 
418 Wendell Robison: Second 
419 
420 Eric Larsen: Wendell seconds that one. Debbie seconded number two. All in 
421 favor say aye (audible response is a collective AYE) 
422 
423 Number three: #3 Granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a 
424 substantial property right possessed by other properties in the same 
425 district. 
426 
427 I would accept a motion on Item #3. 
428 
429 Wendell Robison: I would move that there is no special arrangement that 
430 would interfere with the enjoyment of property. 
431 
432 Eric Larsen: ok. Wendell has made that motion. Is there a second. 
433 
434 Marty Lunt: Second: 
435 
436 Eric Larsen: Marty has seconded. Any questions? All in favor say "aye". 
437 (audible response is a collective AYE) any opposed? (no response) 
438 
439 Number four: #4 The variance will not substantially affect the general plan 
440 and will not be contrary to the public interest. I would accept a motion on 
441 number four pause...getting bored of making motions? I will make the 
442 motion that this also be denied. Is there a second to that motion? 
443 
444 Wendell Robison: Second. 
445 
446 Eric Larsen: Wendell has seconded. Any questions? All in favor say aye. 
447 (audible response is a collective AYE) Any opposed? (No response) 
448 
449 And number five #5 - The spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed and 
450 substantial justice is done. I need a motion for that one. 
451 
452 Wendell Robison: So be it. 
453 
454 Eric Larsen: Which "so be it way do you want to vote: 
455 
456 Wendell Robison: That it does not exceed the criteria (inaudible) 
457 
458 Eric Larsen: Ok, is there a second to that motion? 
459 
460 Judy Huntsman: Second 
461 
462 Eric Larsen: Judy has seconded. Any questions? All in favor say "aye" 
463 (audible response is a collective AYE) any opposed (no response) Motion 
464 carried. 
465 
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467 
468 Eric Larsen: It just doesn't look like the structure thing is going to do it, or the 
469 variance either. 
470 
471 James K. Slavens: I think it would be appropriate to get a vote on the definition 
472 of structure. 
473 
474 Eric Larsen: OK. a.. There has also been the questions raised about the 
475 definition of structure and I will read the definition again. 
476 
477 "anything constructed the use of which requires a fixed location on or in 
478 the ground or attached to something having a fixed location on the 
479 ground, and which imposes an impervious material on or above the 
480 ground" 
481 
482 Does anyone feel that the structure that has been constructed at Mr. Steven's 
483 does not apply to that definition? Is that a motion Wendell? 
484 
485 Wendell Robison: I would make a motion that it is a permanent fixture 
486 attached to the ground made of impervious material. 
487 
488 Eric Larsen: Is there a second to that motion? 
489 
490 Judy Huntsman: Second. 
491 
492 Eric Larsen: Judy has seconded. Any other questions? All in favor say 
493 "Aye" (audible response a collective AYE) 
494 



























DISTRICT COURT'S RULING ON PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THAD STEVENS, RULING ON PETITIONER'S PETITION 
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Petitioner, 
v. Case No. 080700143 
FILLMORE CITY, Judge Donald Eyre, Jr. 
Respondent. 
Petitioner Thad Stevens filed a Petition for Judicial Review with the Court on August 27, 
2008 based on a hearing held in front of the Fillmore City Board of Adjustment on July 31, 2008. 
Respondent Fillmore City filed a response on October 6,2008. The Court held a review hearing on 
April 13,2009, during which it instructed the parties to prepare memoranda on the matter. Petitioner 
filed his memorandum of law on April 28, and Respondent filed an opposing memorandum on May 
5, 2009. Petitioner filed a reply memorandum in support of his petition on May 14, 2009. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This petition stems from a dispute over a metal covering (also referred to by the parties as 
a "carport" or "canopy") installed on Petitioner's driveway in Fillmore sometime prior to April 2008. 
Petitioner apparently installed the covering to protect his vehicle from adverse weather conditions. 
The covering is secured to the concrete ground and extends to a point less than 25 feet from the front 
of the property line. 
On or about April 16, 2008, Petitioner was served notice by the Fillmore City Building 
Inspector indicating that the covering violated a Fillmore City zoning ordinance requiring all 
structures on a residential property to be set back at least 25 feet from the front property line. 
Petitioner appealed the decision before the Board of Adjustment ("the Board") at a hearing on July 
31, 2008, arguing that he was entitled to a variance. The Board, after some discussion, denied the 
appeal and adjourned the hearing. 
ISSUES AND LEGAL STANDARD 
Petitioner argues here that he is entitled to judicial review of the board's decision based on 
a disagreement with the Board's interpretation of certain ordinance definitions as well as a due 
process argument. 
The Court may review the Board's decision subject to the restraints found in the Fillmore 
Municipal Code as well as the Utah Code. 
The Fillmore City Municipal Code § 6-5-11 states: 
Any person adversely affected by any decision of the Board of Adjustment may 
petition the district court for a review of the decision. In the petition, the plaintiff 
may only allege that the Board of Adjustment's decision was arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal. 
The review standard is further elucidated by Utah Code Annotated § 10-9a-801, which states, in 
relevant part: 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or 
in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the 
decision with the district court within 30 days after the local land use decision is 
final. 
(3) (a) The courts shall: 
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority 
of this chapter is valid; and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, 
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative 
discretion is valid if it is reasonably debatable that the decision, ordinance, or 
regulation promotes the purposes of this chapter and is not otherwise illegal. 
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the 
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. 
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, 
ordinance, or regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the 
decision was made or the ordinance or regulation adopted. 
(7) (a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit 
to the reviewing court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes, findings, 
orders, and, if available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings. 
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape recording is a true 
and correct transcript for purposes of this Subsection (7). 
(8) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record 
provided by the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be. 
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of the 
land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that evidence was 
offered to the land use authority or appeal authority, respectively, and the court 
determines that it was improperly excluded. 
ANALYSIS 
Petitioner first argues in his petition that the Board's decision was arbitrary or capricious 
because the covering installed on his driveway was not a "structure" as defined by the Fillmore 
Municipal Code. 
Fillmore Municipal Code 6-7-8.3 states: 
Accessory structures must be set back 25 feet from the front property line and 3 feet 
from the side property line, unless attached and then set back 8 feet from the side 
property line. 
The word "structure" is defined in the Municipal Code § 6-2 as follows: 
Anything constructed, the use of which requires a fixed location on or in the ground, 
or attached to something having a fixed location on the ground and which imposes 
an impervious material on or above the ground; definition includes "Building." 
The word "building" is defined in the Municipal Code § 6-2 as: 
Any structure, whether temporary or permanent, having a roof, and used or built for 
the shelter or enclosure of persons, animals, possessions, or property of any kind. 
Petitioner contends that the covering in his driveway meets neither the definition of structure or 
building as found in the Municipal Code. 
Petitioner correctly notes that the Municipal Code definitions of building and structure appear 
to include the respective terms in their own definitions, which presents some confusion. However, 
the intent of the Municipal Code's drafters can be discerned by focusing on the other language in the 
definitions. 
The Court first considers the definition of the word structure in the Municipal Code. Clearly 
Petitioner's covering is something constructed which requires and is attached to a fixed location on 
the ground and imposes a material of some kind on or above the ground. The main dispute is over 
whether the material imposed is impervious. Petitioner claims, citing Webster's Dictionary, that 
impervious requires something "not allowing entrance or passage." Since the covering itself does 
allow passage of a car or person through it, Petitioner argues that it is not impervious. 
The Board, in its decision, focused not on whether the covering itself was impervious, but 
whether it was composed of an impervious material. During the July 31 hearing, board member Eric 
Larsen said: "We are not talking about impervious everything. We are talking about impervious 
material, and steel is an impervious material Material used it can be made of swiss cheese, if the 
material is impervious, it would qualify as impervious, it doesn't matter how many holes, open 
windows, or open doors you have, it is a structure by definition, as I read it, which is made out of 
impervious material - and that could be wood, that could be glass, or that could be plexiglass, 
plastic..." (Transcript of July 31,2008 Hearing ("Transcript"), Ins. 205-06,216-21.) At the end of 
the hearing, at Petitioner's counsel's request, the Board voted unanimously that the definition of 
structure in the Municipal Code is "a permanent fixture attached to the ground made of impervious 
material." (Transcript, Ins. 485-93.) 
In reviewing the decision of the Board on this point and all other points, the Court may not 
base its findings on whether or not it agrees with the Board's decision. The Court, in fact, must 
initially "presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of this chapter 
is valid." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(a)(i). The Court may only decide the Board's decision 
is not valid if it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record, or it was arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal. Id. § 10-9a-801(3)(c). Substantial evidence is defined under Utah law as "that quantum 
and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a 
conclusion." First Natl Bank of Boston v. County Bd ofEqualization, 799 P.2d 1163,1165 (Utah 
1990). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a district court may find a decision of a Board of 
Adjustment arbitrary or capricious only if the decision was "so unreasonable" as to be labeled as 
such. Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1984). "It does not 
lie within the prerogative of the trial court to substitute its judgment for that of the Board where the 
record discloses a reasonable basis for the Board's decision." Id. "Indeed, municipal land use 
decisions as a whole are generally entitled to a 'great deal of deference."5 Bradley v. Pay son City 
Corp., 2003 UT 16, H 10, 70 P.3d 47 (internal citation omitted). 
Having reviewed the record and the transcript of the proceedings, the Court finds here that 
the Board's interpretation of the definition of a structure was reasonable, and therefore not arbitrary 
or capricious. There is likewise substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's conclusion. 
While Petitioner is correct that the entire covering is not impervious, the Municipal Code requires 
only an imposition of an impervious material As the Municipal Code does not further define the 
term, the Board reached a reasonable conclusion that the covering imposed such a material on or 
above the ground. 
The Board's finding might also be substantiated by the description found in the definition 
of the word building in the Municipal Code. Petitioner's driveway covering has a roof and is used 
for the shelter of "possessions or property," i.e. his vehicle. Petitioner specifically expressed in the 
July 31 hearing that the purpose of the covering was to "protect his vehicles from snow, rain, and 
other things that may do damage to his vehicle." (Transcript, Ins. 81-82.) Petitioner's covering 
therefore fits all the requirements of a building other than, arguably, whether or not it is a structure. 
Petitioner next argues that even if the covering fits the definition of structure, he is 
nevertheless entitled to a variance. The requirements for a variance are set out in Utah Code 
Annotated § 10-9a-702: 
(2) (a) The appeal authority may grant a variance only if: 
(i) literal enforcement of the ordinance would cause an unreasonable hardship 
for the applicant that is not necessary to carry out the general purpose of the 
land use ordinances; 
(ii) there are special circumstances attached to the property that do not 
generally apply to other properties in the same zone; 
(iii) granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial 
property right possessed by other property in the same zone; 
(iv) the variance will not substantially affect the general plan and will not be 
contrary to the public interest; and 
(v) the spirit of the land use ordinance is observed and substantial justice 
done. 
See also Fillmore Municipal Code § 6-5-6. 
Again, the Court may only overturn the Board's denial of a variance if it finds that the 
decision was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary or capricious. In reviewing the transcript of the July 
31 hearing, the Court finds that the Board considered each of the variance factors and reasonably 
concluded that they did not apply. 
The Board found at the hearing that the 25-foot ordinance was created for the "health, safety, 
and welfare of the community." (Transcript, Ins. 251-52.) Allowing Petitioner's covering, the Board 
found, would not satisfy the first variance requirement, as Petitioner made no showing that it would 
impose an unreasonable hardship that was not necessary to carry out this purpose. 
The Board also found that the second requirement of special circumstances was not satisfied. 
Eric Larsen said at the hearing: "It has to be something unique about the property that zoning that 
is applied in that general area, the uniqueness of that piece or property has to be unique, one of a 
kind." (Transcript, Ins.. 273-75.) This finding is in harmony with the Utah Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the variance statute: "It is not enough to show that the property for which the 
variance is requested is different in some way from the property surrounding it. Each piece of 
property is unique. What must be shown by the applicant for the variance is that the property itself 
contains some special circumstance that relates to the hardship complained of and that granting a 
variance to take this into account would not substantially affect the zoning plan." Xanthos v. Board 
of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032,1036 (1984). 
Third, the Board found that granting the variance was not substantial to the enjoyment of a 
substantial property right observed by other property. Eric Larsen stated: "Well, if we granted this 
structure to remain, a... violating the zoning ordinance, then we would have to open it up to 
everybody, and we would come up with all kinds of impervious materials to deal with." (Transcript, 
Ins. 282-85.) 
Fourth, the Board found that the variance would be contrary to the public interest. Again 
quoting Eric Larsen: "The twenty five foot setback is in the public interest, it's one of those things 
that they have had allowed zoning to continue because it affects the health, safety and welfare of the 
community. Property values are affected when people start to encroach clear out to the public 
sidewalk..." (Transcript, Ins. 288-92.) 
Finally, the Board held that the fifth requirement did not apply. "[T]he law says you either 
knew or should have known that there were zoning laws, it was published a long time ago and you 
can't... it makes it difficult when the City has to try to send a letter to everybody anticipating that 
they are going to start building something because they never know." (Transcript, Ins. 300-04.) 
The Court finds that the Board had a reasonable basis for each of these decisions, and 
explained its reasoning before voting unanimously on them to deny the variance. "[I]t is incumbent 
upon the party challenging the Board's findings or decision to marshal all of the evidence in support 
thereof and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of conflicting or contradictory 
evidence, the findings and decision are not supported by substantial evidence." Patterson v. Utah 
County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 n.7. The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to 
make this showing. 
Finally, Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated by his inability to present 
evidence at the July 31 hearing. Petitioner argues that although he did not specifically state so in his 
original Petition, his position is that the Board's decision "was illegal because it amounted to a 
taking without just compensation." (Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for Judicial 
Review ("Memo in Support"), at 6.) For the Board's decision to be considered illegal, Petitioner 
must show that it "violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was made 
or the ordinance or regulation adopted." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(d). 
Petitioner claims that "the Petitioner sought to introduce evidence to the Board of Adjustment 
concerning the issue of a variance; however, Petitioner was denied any opportunity to do so... It was 
obvious that the Board was not interested in hearing any evidence. Petitioner desired to present 
evidence, but no meaningful opportunity was given." (Memo in Support, at 5.) 
Due process at the administrative level requires only that a hearing be conducted at which 
an applicant is given the opportunity to present evidence and argument. "What this includes is an 
opportunity to present her cause, that is, her evidence and her contentions, to a tribunal vested with 
authority to make a determination thereon." Peatross v. Board of Commissioners, 555 P.2d 283 
(Utah 1976). See also McGrew v. Industrial Comm 'n, 85. P.2d 608 ("The 'hearing' is the hearing 
of evidence and argument. If the one who determines the facts which underlie the order has not 
considered evidence or argument, it is manifest that the hearing has not been given.") (internal 
citation omitted). 
The Court, reviewing the transcript of the July 31 hearing, finds that due process was not 
violated: that Petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to present evidence and argument, and that 
no evidence given was improperly excluded. Petitioner's counsel was given, at the outset of the 
hearing, a significant amount of time to explain his position, to present pictures of Petitioner's 
covering and the property, and to discuss each of the variance requirements. (Transcript, Ins. 23-
108.) In fact, none of the board members said anything until Petitioner's counsel requested that they 
ask questions. (Transcript, In. 110). Further, after Eric Larsen explained the Board's reasoning 
concerning the variance requirements, Petitioner's counsel was given another opportunity to discuss 
his position and present additional argument and evidence in support of his request. (Transcript, Ins. 
329-386.) The Board voted on the variance only after all of these arguments were heard and 
Petitioner's evidence was presented. The transcript reveals no instance where Petitioner's counsel 
asked to present more evidence and was denied. 
Because the Court finds that Petitioner has not shown that evidence was improperly excluded 
at the July 31 hearing, "[t]he court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record." 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(8)(a)(ii). Petitioner's request to present additional evidence to the 
Court is therefore denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner has failed to show that the Board of Adjustment's decision was not based on 
substantial evidence in the record or was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. The Court therefore denies 
Petitioner's request for reconsideration of the decision. 
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